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“We will express our demands rationally.” (1)
The first time I heard the term rationality (lixing 理性) was during aninterview in the summer of 2010 with urban residents from Panyu, adistrict in Southern Guangzhou. The conversation took place several
months after a protest by local homeowners and villagers had succeeded
in suspending a proposal to build a Waste to Energy (WTE) incinerator a
few kilometres from their neighbourhood. The interviewees stressed that in
their dealings with the government their strategy was to act rationally. Re-
calling that the literature on local resistance against proposed projects –
often dismissed as Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) movements – emphasises
the tendency for activists to stress that their motives come from reason
rather than emotion or self-interest, I paid little attention to the term at
the time. (2) However, in subsequent conversations with other homeowners
protesting WTE incineration over the next two years, I noticed that the con-
cept of rationality came up repeatedly in interviews, and that it was used
both in first-person petitions to government officials and in appeal letters.
I began to question how urban environmental protesters used the concept
of “rationality” to frame their contentions and express their demands. 
This paper examines the current debate over WTE incineration in
Guangzhou, China, and how a group of homeowner activists participating
in urban environmental contentions understand and frame their own re-
sistance. It examines the reasons they offer as they reject proposed tech-
nologies that they and other urban citizens perceive to be of considerable
risk to the environment and their health but which are promoted by the
state as advanced and safe technology. I focus on homeowners in the Panyu
and Huadu districts of Guangzhou who live in gated communities near pro-
posed incineration facilities and who have been the most outspoken mem-
bers of ongoing anti-incineration actions since 2009. That year, government
plans for the construction of WTE incinerators in Guangzhou to deal with
the rapidly growing amount of waste spurred a public controversy that re-
ceived national coverage and attention. Citizens debated where and under
what conditions WTE incineration might be an appropriate technology for
waste treatment. 
Through many hours spent with activists, I discovered that residents held
a diverse range of views on WTE incineration. (3) Some consider incinerators
harmful or question the state’s ability to manage projects, while others say
that they support the technology and are interested only in relocating the
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facility further away from their own homes. Moreover, activists from Panyu
and Huadu have chosen slightly different focuses. Activists from Panyu high-
light the need for recycling, while those from Huadu are primarily interested
in provoking the authorities to reconsider the location of a nearby inciner-
ator. However, both groups of homeowners emphasise the “rationality” of
their approach. 
I argue that homeowners highlight their “rationality” as a discursive device
to create a political position for themselves in contrast and opposition to
village resisters – their ostensible allies – and to the state, specifically to its
approach to modernisation through technological solutions. I argue that
framing their resistance as “rational” has two effects for urban homeowner
protesters. First, it explicitly separates the form and content of protest by
urban homeowners from those of villagers, thereby carving out new modes
of contention based on dialogue and negotiation that are in contrast to
what homeowners view as villagers’ willingness to resort to “emotion.” Sec-
ond, the term “rationality” situates their argument within a scientific dis-
course aimed at contesting the legitimacy of state policies that rely on
technology for waste management. By offering their own more “rational”
solution, homeowners argue that the appropriate approach to waste man-
agement involves not only a reliance on technology but also an overall shift
in the social management of the flow of materials in society. This article
starts with a brief background on waste as an urban environmental problem
in China and on the resulting nascent homeowner activism in Guangzhou.
I situate the rise of homeowner activism within the literature on citizen and
environmental contention to examine how rational resistance serves as
both a distinguishing tactic and as a critique of the politics of state-led
waste management. 
Waste as an urban environmental problem
in China
Since economic reform, China’s urban waste infrastructure has been in-
creasingly overwhelmed by a growth in consumption and a lifestyle of dis-
posal. In 2004, China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest
waste-generating nation, and by 2030 China’s annual solid waste output is
predicted to increase another 150%, from about 190 million tons to more
than 480 million tons. (4) Guangzhou’s 18 million residents produce 18,000
tons of municipal solid waste each day. (5)
WTE incinerators burn waste to produce energy, mostly in the form of elec-
tricity or other fuels such as methanol. The Chinese state promotes WTE in-
cineration as the preferred “advanced” technology to deal with the mounting
waste crisis. Advocates see the technology as an effective solution for energy
recovery with little demand on scarce land. WTE incineration receives state
subsidies for renewable energy in China and support from the Asian Devel-
opment Bank and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). State policy
documents, such as the “Twelfth Five-Year” Construction Plan for National
Urban Household Garbage Harmless Disposal Facilities” (released in 2012),
cite goals of treating 35% of waste through incineration, and over 48% in
more developed east coast cities by the year 2015, up from 12.88% in 2005.
As of fall 2013, there were two WTE incinerators in Guangzhou, one burning
1,000 tons/day and another burning 2,000 tons/day in its testing stage. By
2015, the city hopes to increase the total amount of waste treated by WTE
incineration to 62% by building five more facilities. (6)
The state’s technocratic approach to managing waste through WTE incin-
eration exemplifies a desire for ecological modernisation where waste is
metabolised into energy with minimal byproducts. (7) The state’s support of
WTE incineration is buttressed by what James Scott has called a high mod-
ernist ideology, characterised by an unwavering and utopian faith in scien-
tific and technical progress for social improvement. (8) The state relies on
waste experts (scientists and engineers) to provide evidence to support of-
ficial waste management schemes, and by extension, the implicit legitimacy
of their vision for the remaking of the modern urban environment. (9)
In the process of implementing these plans, however, WTE incineration
has brought a group of homeowners who have bought housing adjacent to
waste incineration facilities into conflict with the state’s modernising proj-
ects. Plans to build a large number of WTE incinerators in the last ten years
have led to protests in urban centres such as Beijing, Hangzhou, and Wuxi. (10)
Disputes over WTE incinerators highlight the tension between the state’s
desire to use technology as a mark of development and the increasing sus-
picion of many urbanites towards this ostensibly “advanced” technology.
Environmental groups and local residents argue that WTE incineration is
both capital-intensive and highly polluting. Weak standards and enforce-
ment often fail to curtail the release of a host of toxins, including fine par-
ticulates, heavy metals, and dioxins. Furthermore, protesters argue that
incineration weakens the incentive for recycling and other more resource-
friendly methods of waste management. Since the 2009 protests in Panyu,
villagers and homeowners in other districts such as Huadu, Baiyun, and
Chonghua have engaged in different forms of resistance to existing and pro-
posed facilities.
The waste protesters of Guangzhou represent a growing subset of the
urban population who increasingly question and protest urban environmen-
tal problems such as suffocating smog, toxic waterways, and high-risk in-
frastructure. Concerns over the construction of a Maglev (magnet levitation)
rail extension in Shanghai in 2008 and anti-Paraxylene (PX) protests in Kun-
ming in early 2013 are some of the more prominent examples of how Chi-
nese citizens are engaging in what the media and observers have called a
growing urban environmental consciousness, with participation from not
only rural pollution victims and environmentalists but increasingly also from
urban residents. (11) While most urban environmental contentions comprise
a mix of concerned actors – villagers, students, NGOs, and nearby residents
– the organisation and participation of what some scholars have identified
as “middle class homeowners” or “upwardly mobile” groups have received
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the most attention, particularly since they had previously been charac-
terised as largely apolitical. (12)
Homeowner activists
Scholars are just beginning to turn their focus to an emerging “middle
class” or upwardly mobile group of environmental protesters in China who
have only recently begun to participate in street protests and to engage
with the state. While the men and women I encountered at government
petitioning days (13) (jiefangri 接访日), in chat groups, and in interviews were
primarily white-collar workers in their mid-30s to mid-50s – for example,
computer programmers, business owners, and office assistants – describing
urban homeowners as “middle-class” does not address the critical com-
monality shared by protesters who regard their own identity as distinct. (14)
I’ve stuck to the terminology used by participants to address the two groups
that are actively protesting Guangzhou’s incinerators: “homeowner” (yezhu
业主), to describe protesters who have moved to newly constructed housing
communities, and “villager” (cunmin 村民), to describe those living in sur-
rounding villages. What these diverse individuals participating in anti-incin-
eration action share is that they bought apartments outside of the city
centre in close proximity to proposed waste infrastructure, some in search
of a better environment, to escape the noise and congested air and traffic
of city centres, and to take advantage of competitive real estate prices. (15)
Zhang Li, in her study of middle class homeowners in Kunming, argues
that an important process of class-making in contemporary China occurs
through the acquisition of real estate to create spaces of comfort and pri-
vate retreat. She notes that when developers threaten the process, home-
owners typically resort to a form of civic activism. (16) I argue that
homeowner anti-incineration protests highlight the fact that attempts by
the contemporary Chinese middle class to seek private retreat can never be
completely disentangled from certain “publics,” in this case, the urban en-
vironment. Homeowners inevitably become drawn into the political geo-
graphic of urban development and infrastructure as their search for
affordable real estate spurs them to participate in debates on waste man-
agement. 
Two of the most vocal communities making cases against state-sponsored
modern waste treatment through WTE incineration in Guangzhou are
homeowners from Panyu and Huadu. The southern district of Panyu houses
some of the first large real estate developments in Guangzhou. Huadu, an
hour’s drive north of the city centre, is a more recent development for
homeowners who can afford more spacious accommodation for the ex-
tended family as a weekend getaway. (17) These large gated communities
come with amenities for urban living and in some cases simulate neigh-
bourhoods typical of North American suburbs, with their own grocery stores,
restaurants, artificial lakes, elementary schools, and manicured lawns. Private
security guards patrol the landscape and residents regularly need to produce
identification and proof of residence. Immediately outside the housing com-
plexes lies a collection of villages with segmented fields, ponds for aqua-
culture, and small to mid-sized factories. Located near both neighbouring
factories of the PRD and Guangzhou, these villages do not resemble the
empty rural spaces of China’s interior provinces. Villagers who leave for work
still return home regularly, and migrant workers from outside Guangzhou
come in search of housing rentals when they work in nearby factories.
In 2009, news of a proposed incineration facility to be built on top of an
existing landfill at Huijiang Village in Panyu quickly spread to residents of
several large real estate complexes within 10 km of the facility. Residents
engaged in a series of heated online discussions on housing community
message boards. (18) Soon afterward, homeowners drafted a petition against
the facility and circulated anti-incineration flyers. Homeowners also began
petitioning the government and writing letters to People’s Congress dele-
gates. On 23 November 2009, a few hundred people turned up on the public
petitioning day for the newly established city management committee
(chengguanwei 城管委) to protest the proposed incinerator. The govern-
ment responded by announcing that it would delay the project and allow
for more public consultation. In April 2012, after rounds of reassessment
and in order to quell public discontent, the government announced that it
would move the project to Dagang, a district about 20 km from the Panyu
city centre. Despite murmurs of disapproval, local villagers at the new site
were relocated, and construction began in spring 2013. 
Homeowners in Huadu have also been protesting incineration since 2009.
A facility initially proposed in 2008 was suspended in 2009 at the same
time that the Panyu facility was put on hold. However, in May 2012, resi-
dents noticed an announcement of resumption of the project on a govern-
ment website. Homeowners in several housing complexes began organising
monthly visits to the district and municipal governments. In June 2012,
homeowners staged a planned protest with several hundred people. Resi-
dents continued to attend monthly petitions of the government, and on 12
July 2013, the Huadu district government announced that it would recon-
sider the original location and proposed another nearby village as their likely
first choice for the new project. Residents around the second, newly pro-
posed Huadu site rallied quickly, and two more large demonstrations took
place by the end of July 2013. Negotiations between protesters and the
government are ongoing.
Framing resistance in China
I draw primarily on two literatures and debates to frame homeowner
protests and resistance in China. First, Kevin O’Brien and Li Lianjiang’s con-
cept of rightful resistance offers a valuable model for understanding forms
of resistance – especially common in China – that lie somewhere between
revolutionary social movements and quiet everyday resistance. (19) Using
examples of rural protests, they argue that resisters identify the gap be-
tween lower-level government and the types of institutional protection
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granted by higher-level officials to force local compliance. Although O’Brien
and Li expand their theoretical model to other countries, their argument
derives from rural protests in China and most accurately reflects the condi-
tions of rural protesters who have limited access to information and who
tend to emphasise the central government’s duty to uphold and protect the
rights that citizens have been granted.
Second, Peter Ho and Richard Edmonds’ work on “embedded environmen-
talism” is critical to framing environmental action in China. They argue that
contemporary activism – especially environmentalism through non-gov-
ernmental organisations (NGOs) – is a fragmentary, highly localised, and
non-confrontational movement. (20) Ho and Edmonds characterise this type
of activism as “greening without conflict,” where the semi-authoritarian
limitations on speech and direct confrontation have led to shifts in political
strategy that create new opportunities for political organisation and en-
gagement. (21) Their work shows that NGOs often represent a negotiated
symbiosis between the Party and state on the one hand and informal social
networks on the other. NGOs provide channels of interaction and negotia-
tion with state actors. (22) Purposeful and strategic “depolicitisation” of rhet-
oric in many environmental movements is therefore not a limiting process
but rather an adaptive political strategy that ultimately enables collabora-
tion and resistance within a semi-authoritarian state. Both O’Brien and Ho’s
theories are especially notable, given that they pay particular attention to
both the form and content of citizen contentions within China’s political
context and highlight modes of resistance of two groups – villagers and en-
vironmentalists – especially those working for NGOs or grassroots environ-
mental groups. However, neither O’Brien nor Ho adequately accounts for
the method of resistance or the position of new homeowner activists en-
gaged in environmental contentions who are careful to set themselves apart
from villagers and yet do not constitute the organised environmentalism
of NGOs.
Resistance against facility siting in the West is often framed through the
NIMBY literature, and as a result, homeowner activists are often portrayed
as localised protesters with narrowly defined interests. The NIMBY literature
tries to assess why participants choose to resist local projects, and  whether
their protests have the potential to transform into larger social movements.
The literature has been criticised for a simplistic dualism in its framing of
local opposition as driven by limited economic or self-interested concerns,
such as real estate value that might or might not lead to larger environ-
mental and social movements. (23) Discussions of NIMBYism in the Western
context have recently focused on community opposition to new renewable
energy facilities. (24) Other scholars expand the concept to encompass locally
unwanted land-use (LULU), or attend to the transition from local opposition
to larger environmental movements, or what can be described as the tran-
sition from “not-in-my backyard” to “not on my planet” protests. Previous
studies of NIMBY movements in Taiwan illustrate that anti-incineration ag-
itation uses local-based oppositional movements to agitate for greater pub-
lic participation, and that these direct actions coincide with democratic
movements. (25) Peng Lin and Wu Fengshi note that while NIMBY mobilisa-
tion has grown increasingly violent in China, the Panyu case in Guangzhou
represents a departure from NIMBYism because of the transition by activists
to policy advocacy. (26)
Generally speaking, the NIMBY literature over-emphasises the distinction
between “environmental” claims and localised, “self-interested” contentions
and overlooks the range of strategies local actors use to position themselves
and their multiple demands within a political context of state repression.
NIMBY framings of environmental politics begin by questioning why ac-
tivists reject certain projects, paying particular attention to their own logic
and reasons (i.e., their concerns about localised pollution), but ultimately
relegate individual intentions and meaningful action of actors to a question
of whether a particular localised or individualised concern can or cannot
scale up into a larger collective social movement. The scope and possibility
for this transition from individual to collective resistance is extremely lim-
ited in contemporary China. Cai Yongshun has argued that the middle class
tends to shy away from activities that threaten the political order because,
on the one hand, they benefit relatively more from reform, while on the
other, like workers and peasants, they face strong state repression when or-
ganising. (27) The arrest of three homeowner activists accused of trying to
incite villagers in a protest against an incinerator in Huizhou, Guangdong,
on 5 September 2013 illustrates the difficulty of creating collective alliances
between villagers and homeowners. (28) One homeowner pointed out that
one of the state’s greatest fears is increased interaction between home-
owners and villagers, and public security was focused on homeowners who
approached villagers. (29)
Thomas Johnson also highlights the “rationality” that campaigners use to
elevate their resistance to incineration siting to a public health issue. (30)
Johnson argues that framing the debate in terms of public health allows
campaigners to avoid the pejorative NIMBY label and to gain political le-
gitimacy while avoiding forms of politics that overtly challenge the power
of the state. As my research shows, the articulation of their demands in
terms of “rational resistance” by homeowners is not, however, merely a
strategic act to escape the NIMBY label. Rationality also signals the aspira-
tion of homeowners for an alternative form of politics involving new en-
gagement with the process of decision-making around public infrastructure
to challenge the legitimacy of state-sponsored science and technology.
The scholarship on the public reception of technology within science stud-
ies on how citizens position their own rejection of WTE incineration illumi-
nates the particular logic and effects of citizens’ rejection of large
infrastructure projects and the ways that citizens draw on claims of science
to reject and critique specific state-sponsored technology. (31) A key contri-
bution of this scholarship is the emphasis on the fact that lay experts and
everyday knowledge can often be more effective in providing an assessment
48 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 4 / 2
20. Peter Ho and Richard Louis Edmonds (eds), China’s Embedded Activism: Opportunities and con-
straints of a social movement, London and New York, Routledge, 2008.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Kristy Michaud et al., “Nimbyism vs. environmentalism,” art. cit., p 1.
24. Patrick Devine-Wright, “Beyond NIMBYism: towards an integrated framework for understanding
public perception of wind energy,” Wind Energy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2005, pp. 125-139.
25. Hsu, Shu-Hsiang, “NIMBY Opposition and Solid Waste Incinerator Siting in Democratising Taiwan,”
The Social Science Journal, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2006, pp. 453-59.
26. Peng Lin and Wu Fengshi, “Beyond NIMBYism, China’s Environment Social Mobilisation,” China
Policy Institute Blog, 8 April 2013, http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/
2013/04/08/beyond-nimbyism-chinas-environment-social-mobilisation/ (accessed on 14 March
2014).
27. Cai Yongshun, “China’s moderate middle class: The Case of Homeowners’ Resistance,” Asian Survey,
Vol. 6, No. 5, 2005, pp. 777-799.
28. BBC China, “Three people arrested over protesting incineration construction in Guangdong” (in
Chinese), 5 September 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/trad/china/2013/09/130905_guang-
dong_arrests.shtml (accessed on 29 October 2013).
29. Interview, 24 April 2013. 
30. Thomas Johnson, “The Health Factor in Anti-Waste Incinerator Campaigns in Beijing and
Guangzhou,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 214, No. 2, 2013, pp. 356-375.
31. Peter Kirby, Troubled Nature: Waste, environment, Japan, Honolulu, University of Hawai’i Press,
2011. 
Special feature
of potential risk and pollution. (32) Moreover, environmental controversies
have been a powerful force spurring citizen participation in evaluating the
legitimacy of scientific claims to support specific technologies, with many
citizens using lay science to challenge technologies deemed beacons of
modernity and development. (33) In the global north, scholarship on the pro-
duction of science has challenged the separation of the domains of science
and politics and cast it as a fundamental characteristic of modernity. (34) The
China case is an interesting example of how citizens in the global south
draw on the discourse of rationality to offer a critique of the state’s attempt
to realise technological modernity in a context where citizens are well aware
of the influence of politics over science.
Apart from villagers: Rational resistance as a
distinguishing tactic
“Villagers are full of passion; we [homeowners] are more rational.” (35)
Outside of the municipal city management committee office on petitioning
day, individual homeowners, many having taken the morning off from work,
arrive one by one to make their case to officials. As villager leaders, having al-
ready finished their appeal, emerge from the office, a group of homeowners
has started to gather outside. As the villagers leave, they exchange a few words
with homeowners. Given the location of incineration facilities on the outskirts
of cities, local villagers affected by waste facilities seem to be homeowners’
natural allies as they face similar threats of pollution and, rather than a de-
crease in property value, are often confronted with the more severe threat of
relocation. Despite similar protest tactics and interests, however, homeowners
strategically emphasise rationality to signal a new distinctive mode of political
engagement to set themselves apart from villagers.
“[We rely on] tactics with words rather than with weapons” (wendou bushi
wudou 文斗不是武斗). (36) I’m speaking to a homeowner after petitioning
day, and the interviewee highlights the importance of rational expression
(lixing biaoda 理性表达) in addressing the effectiveness of protest. (37) A pe-
tition letter is presented to me as a sign of their rational appeal. The docu-
ment contains a lengthy argument drawing on newspaper reports of
problems with existing incinerators, NGO cases outlining declining reliance
on incinerators in countries such as Japan and Denmark, and scientific re-
ports on environmental standards. An important element of rational expres-
sion is the drawing together of facts and sources from recognised domains
of knowledge – the media, scientific reports, and policy. Government peti-
tioning days, intended as a space where officials receive grievances from
citizens, have become forums of heated exchange between officials and ac-
tivists armed with prepared speeches and analysis reports. After a successful
day of petitioning, homeowners comment, “We left the officials with no
words” (tamen dou mei hua shuole 他们都没话说了). (38)
In contrast, only a select group of village leaders turns up to represent entire
village interests. One homeowner protester, a women in her early thirties
employed by a foreign company, tells me that “villagers can only repeat that
they are against incinerators, but they never go further to tell you why,” im-
plying that villagers are incapable of presenting rational arguments to the
state. (39) The comment “we don’t know how to speak“ (women buhuishuo
我们不会说) is a phrase commonly heard amongst villagers affected by in-
cinerators, especially when talking about difficulties they experience while
confronting government officials. As Anna Lora-Wainwright and Bryan Tilt
have shown, scholarship linking environmental consciousness to the rising
middle class neglects the agency of villagers, who often take action in many
ways to assess, mitigate, and resist the impact of local pollution. (40) However,
villagers are also sensitive to the structural inequality between themselves
and homeowners and their own inability to voice concerns.
Aside from their ability to articulate their arguments and to refer to specific
domains of rational discourse and knowledge, homeowners also use the con-
cept of rationality to emphasise their social distinction from villagers by po-
sitioning rationality against emotion. By appealing to rationality, housing
residents stress their respect for dialogue while explicitly setting themselves
apart from the passion (jiqing 激情) of villagers. As another activist, a business
owner, tells me: “Us urban residents, we’ve all been educated and have dif-
ferent ways of handling these protests. We don’t want anyone to get hurt.
But if we’re left with no alternatives, we’ll have to think of other options.
Take the villagers [for example]; they’ve been left with no choice. When your
life is at stake, no one can be rational.” (41) By characterising villagers as more
emotional, homeowner activists relegate them to a form of antiquated com-
munist-era politics, as emotion or passion was often emphasised in political
campaigns during the Cultural Revolution. (42) What is critical to note in this
case is not whether villagers are objectively more emotional in their tactics,
but that homeowner activists explicitly emphasise this dual and contradic-
tory framework of emotion and rationality. For homeowners to characterise
villagers as emotional and their own form of engagement as rational illus-
trates a desire for social distinction and a way to set their own political en-
gagement, strategies, and subjectivity apart from that of villagers.
In China, the term baoli (暴力), which denotes extreme or violent tactics,
is used to describe any attempt – even a peaceful one – to take to the
streets. In the case of anti-incineration organising in Guangzhou, both
homeowners and villagers employ similar tactics: typically petitions and
street protests. Many homeowners, despite claims to rationality, will often
speak about the power of “going on the street” – most often associated
with villagers and striking workers – as the most effective mode of protest.
Further, during petitions, homeowners will gently but not so subtly “warn”
the government that failure to handle the situation “rationally” risks inciting
a collective incident (quntishijian 群体事件). In the government petitioning
office, seated across from the row of officials, homeowners will whisper to
each other, loud enough so that officials have no way of not hearing: “The
government better take care when handling the situation, you don’t want
to end up with another collective incident on your hands.” (43) Given previous
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protests in Guangzhou and other protests over large infrastructure projects
in cities across China, the warning does not fall on deaf ears. Despite their
strategic emphasis on rational dialogue, the threat of more extreme tactics
is one way that homeowner activists put political pressure on the govern-
ment. While they share comparable tactics with villagers, homeowners dis-
tinguish themselves through rationality to signal that they are a different
social group with a new form of political engagement. 
Finally, homeowners view “rationality” as a characteristic of the “politics
of individuals” and as separate from the collective social appeals of villagers.
Homeowners stress that their status as property owners and their proximity
to the facility as residents entitle them to publicly voice their environmental
and health concerns. One of the most commonly reiterated claims of home-
owners is that each individual has the ability to rationally assess the pro-
posed project and to speak for him or herself. Homeowners often speak of
only representing themselves (wo zhi daibiao wo ziji 我只代表我自己) and
say that their protests are only for “my own health,” and “my own commu-
nity” (weile wo ziji de jiankang, han wei jiayuan 为了我自己的健康, 捍卫家
园). There is a broad consensus among homeowners that although some
are more actively involved in the protest than others, each individual decides
the terms of his or her participation, with little need to commit to long-
term action. Activists specifically resist being described as part of a particular
“organisation” or “movement,” and when asked how the group meets,
homeowners explicitly emphasise that they “have no organisation” (women
meiyou zuzhi 我们没有组织). Their reluctance to be characterised as organ-
ised comes first and foremost from an attempt to avoid being perceived as
a subversive movement by the state. 
The rational individual homeowner protester is set apart from the peti-
tioning village leaders, who are inextricably part of a social collective and
dominated by village social hierarchy and politics. When homeowners are
asked what sets them apart from the villagers, a common reply is that vil-
lagers are more united (tuanjie 团结) or, as one homeowner puts it, they
will all listen to their village leaders. This difference can also be seen in the
different treatment of these two groups by the state. For example, a home-
owner activist recounted that during a petitioning day, a village leader
brought a signed petition with more than 500 signatures of villagers, but
the government argued that all of these distinct 500 signatures only
counted as one single vote against the incinerator. (44)
The discourse of “rationality” serves not to identify different protest tactics
but rather to establish a social distinction between two groups of political
subjects – homeowners and village protesters. The “rational” individualised
political figure of the homeowner appears in diametric opposition to his os-
tensible allies, the villager. Homeowners view villagers as collectives, with
some members able to voice political demands while others emote with
threats of violence. Homeowners, in contrast, portray themselves as logical
individuals capable of articulating their own resistance and engaging in di-
alogue by drawing on science and knowledge. The discourse of rationality
casts villagers as engaged in a politics of force, while positioning homeown-
ers as individuals who are able to engage in a politics of dialogue to chal-
lenge the state’s modernising technologies. 
Against the state: Rational resistance as a
social critique of technology
“Rationality is acting according to the law, but it’s obvious that our
legal system has many weaknesses; it’s even unfair. That’s why we
have to tell [the government] what people think and they have to
listen. I think this is rationality; if the government doesn’t listen, then
they are being irrational.” (45)
In her account of the 2009 Panyu protest, Katherine Zhao draws on
O’Brien’s theory of rightful resistance to examine how “upwardly mobile
groups” place political pressure on the Guangzhou government. She high-
lights homeowners’ access to new information technologies and their social
capital as unique advantages. (46) The homeowner protester against WTE in-
cineration make arguments that go beyond the types of “rightful resistance”
employed by villagers in O’Brien’s theory to suggest that rules, policies, and
regulations do not fit the specific situation in China and to cast doubt on
the ostensible rationality of the government’s decisions in the first place.
Urban “information-rich” citizens are acutely aware of the discrepancy be-
tween centralised policy and local implementation, but in the case of WTE
incineration, promotion of the technology is supported by central policy
and implemented locally. Citizens appealing to the state must then chal-
lenge the logic of state-sponsored technology at every level of government,
from the district city management committee to the provincial bureau of
environmental protection. While compliance with legal regulations and rules
remains an issue, particularly concerning public participation in environ-
mental impact assessments (EIA), what is unique about urban environmen-
tal protesters is that their demands extend beyond an appeal that officials
follow procedure to challenge the logic of the state’s choice of relying on
technological solutions. 
The strategic deployment of the term “rationality” by homeowners locates
their protest within specific modern, logical, and scientific modes of dis-
course. However, instead of appealing to technological specificities or sci-
entific facts, homeowners rely on a critique of society to express what they
deem to be rational or irrational methods of waste treatment. When they
petition the government, homeowners point to what is irrational about the
government’s plans, accusing it of being swayed by business interests, pre-
senting the complicated picture of implementation, and offering their own
more scientific solutions to waste. In contrast to the state’s vision, for urban
homeowners what is rational or scientific requires not only high-tech facil-
ities, but also an overall assessment of the ways that society engages in
waste practice. 
In order to convince the municipal government to abandon WTE inciner-
ation, homeowner activists are faced with the challenge of how to reason
and persuasively communicate that the national policy promoting increased
use of WTE incineration is an irrational choice. Unlike pollution victims who
gather symptoms and catalogue victims in order to highlight the toxicity
of their surroundings, new urban environmental controversies increasingly
begin at the planning and development stage of the projects prior to facil-
ities being constructed. Activists must make their case based on the amount
of assumed “risk” rather than proven damages. First, they must explain why
WTE incineration, a technology that is widely used in the West and sup-
ported by a government campaign and expert testimony, should be rejected
in China. Second, unlike cases in other countries where homeowner activists
can rely on science and independent data to make their case and appeal to
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third-party sampling and testing, the political context of China makes “sci-
ence” a difficult ally. Official government rhetoric provides powerful backing
to the safety of advanced WTE incinerators. Homeowner activists tell me
that in their first attempts to seek help from experts, many question the
viability of incinerators off the record, but few are willing to speak publicly.
Further, activists lack third-party verification to challenge emissions data.
Under (what activists suspect to be) political pressure, testing institutions
they contact often back out at the last minute. Finally, lack of access to
complete versions of environmental impact assessment reports and emis-
sions data makes it difficult to prove there are irregularities in facilities cur-
rently in operation. 
The rise of citizen experts is a defining feature of technological contro-
versies, and China is no exception in this respect. (47) Homeowner residents
have access to a wide range of resources. They are Internet-savvy and have
the skills and knowledge to compare the operation of incinerators in differ-
ent countries. Homeowners also have the ability to consult professionals
with relevant expertise living in the same housing complex. In China, how-
ever, where citizens are acutely suspicious of the influence of politics over
science, homeowner activists increasingly turn away from arguments based
on science and increasingly offer an argument based on the implementation
of technology in China. In making a precautionary claim to environmental
dangers, citizens seek to present a lay perspective. Michel Callon observed
that the goal for the concerned citizens is “not to find one consolidated and
replicable proof, but the gradual construction of hypotheses, combining the-
oretical data with empirical observations, objective and subjective data.” (48)
Rational resistance hinges on the ability of citizen activists to gradually con-
struct a plausible hypothesis that draws together diverse sources of knowl-
edge, both objective and subjective, in order to make their claim. 
The rational case that homeowner activists make for rejecting WTE incin-
eration is less about the “science” of WTE incineration and more about their
lack of faith in how projects are implemented on the ground. Activists ap-
peal to a sense of “Chinese exceptionalism” to make a case for why tech-
nologies that might be safe in Japan and Europe are unlikely to work in
China. Rather than debating the merits of the technology itself, they point
to the overall conditions of how incineration works in practice in their own
city – a lack of relevant environmental standards, the reality of mixed burn-
ing due to the lack of a formalised recycling program, and the weakness of
pollution monitoring. 
Through online research, citizens draw comparisons between China and
other developed countries, especially those with similar urban forms and cul-
tural traditions such as Japan and Taiwan. Homeowners first question the
overall conditions for safe burning given the cost-cutting practices of most
industries in China. As one homeowner tells me, these companies meet stan-
dards during the day (when monitors are working) and emit at night (when
no one is around to catch them). (49) Activists point to existing complaints
over the only WTE incinerator in the city – held up by municipal officials as
a model project – especially the accusation by local villagers of the inciner-
ator burning below what is commonly considered to be a safe tempera-
ture. (50) While both homeowners and villagers questioned the efficacy of
technology, homeowners explicitly frame the problem of implementation as
an irrational waste management policy, arguing that if the city’s model proj-
ect is so rife with problems, incineration in China cannot be reasonably
trusted as safe.
A second point of contention is that the lack of recycling programs in
China often leads to mixed burning. Activists point to countries in Europe
to argue for the importance of recycling in order to prevent toxins generated
by incinerators. As residents argue, “They tell us that they are bringing in
the latest technology from Denmark, but why can [incinerators] work so
well in Denmark? Because they’ve been recycling for over 30 years.” (51)
Huadu activists claim that the proximity of industrial facilities, such as a
local leather factory, will mean the burning of not only household waste
but also leather straps and other industrial waste. The case against mixed
burning illustrates a deeper critique of overall mismanagement of material
flows leading to toxic results. The critique of the failure of waste sorting
links the question of the safety of WTE incineration technology to the larger
problem of implementing municipal-run recycling programs in China. As a
consequence, the issue becomes much broader than questions of advanced
technology and instead touches on crucial concerns about the cooperation
and commitment of governments and citizens to environmental programs. 
Finally, citizen activists highlight the lack of public, transparent systems
for environmental monitoring and assessment. They also draw advice from
a network of their neighbours who are environmental engineers and pro-
fessionals to make a case for the inexperience of the operators selected by
the state. They argue that these inadequate standards increase the risk and
uncertainty associated with operating incinerators in China. One resident
points out that up to 20 different contaminants from incinerators are mon-
itored in Japan, while even a request to the environmental bureau to release
the data for ten pollutants from the local incinerator in Guangzhou came
back incomplete. (52) Another homeowner sums it up: “[The government]
tells us that our technology is cutting edge, but our management structure
is perhaps only third-tier.” (53)
Conclusion: Urban environmental
contentions, new pressures and divisions
With Chinese cities expanding more rapidly and further outwards, the
planning, development, and operation of urban infrastructure will face more
scrutiny from urban citizens. Homeowner resistance to WTE incineration in
Guangzhou represents a prominent example of China’s rising urban envi-
ronmental contention. I argue that “rational resistance” is an important way
for housing residents to frame their own logic, to depoliticise their actions,
and to appeal to institutionalised channels. More importantly, I suggest that
the appeal to rationality and knowledge functions as a way for homeowner
activists to set themselves apart from villagers and the state. The explicit
attempt by homeowners to distinguish themselves from villagers illustrates
the different and uneven ways that urbanites and villagers on the outskirts
of cities confront science and technology. Homeowners’ tendency to draw
a division between their own claims and those of villagers using the con-
cepts of rationality speaks to the formation of a new political subject and
method of resistance through anti-incineration protests. Whereas urban
homeowners are engaged in new “rational” critiques, villagers are equated
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with an antiquated form of political engagement. These distinctions raise
questions about what forms of cooperation, exclusion, and othering are de-
veloping between urbanites and villagers against the backdrop of urban en-
vironmental protest and resistance. Rather than just another form of
NIMBYism, rational resistance also represents a broader critique of state-
sponsored technology and a desire to draw social distinctions between two
groups of urban political subjects.
The emphasis on the “rationality” of technological choice by homeowners
also challenges the modernising visions of the state. Homeowners highlight
the concrete reasons that WTE incineration is not suitable for China by re-
lying on a deeper social critique of the material flows of society and expose
the distance between China’s struggle to introduce modern infrastructure
and its promise of building world-class cities. Pointing to the gap between
Chinese incinerators and incinerators in the West, urban activists engage in
a political critique of society, specifically the lack of environmental man-
agement and social regulation around urban infrastructure and technology.
More importantly, they point to the inability of the government to convince
the public to trust the safety of its pollution monitoring structure. The prob-
lem of waste management, in the eyes of homeowners, is not a technolog-
ical problem but a social one. 
The emphasis on rationality has implications for the scholarship on science
and technology studies outside of the Western context. Rather than seeing
citizen contentions as a case of NIMBY politics, I stress the importance of
attending to the specific claims that homeowners offer to illustrate the ir-
rationality of the state in relying on technological fixes to social problems.
I argue that this represents a broader social critique of the politics of urban
infrastructure rather than an attempt to defend local interests. Scholars in
science and technology studies point out that the separation of science and
society is false and a byproduct of modernity. (54) In China, this fact is
painfully evident to citizen activists. (55) Public resistance to state-led tech-
nologies draws on new forms of knowledge and offers a broad political cri-
tique of the reality of incineration implementation in China. In doing so, the
China case offers an interesting contrast to science and technology studies
literature in the West that engages with technological controversies and
the public reception of technology. The attitude of homeowner activists re-
veals deep ambivalence towards Chinese modernity, and towards science
and technology: on the one hand, they embrace the discourse of rationality
to represent the logic and reason of their tactics and also as a distinguishing
practice from other participants in the urban resistance, namely villagers.
On the other hand, citizens are deeply critical of the state’s claims to and
use of rationality to inform the construction of modern cities. 
Rational resistance is best understood as both a protest strategy and as
a set of new demands by urban protesters. This framing is especially im-
portant at a time when citizen-government dialogue on environmental
issues is becoming more commonplace and is taking place in diverse fo-
rums. Public discussions on waste and gestures of openness by the state
have created new avenues and opportunities for citizen participation. On-
going media coverage and discussion forums on weibo (56) have made
waste a focus for public engagement. Most notably, the Southern Media
Group, one of the most liberal papers in China, played an active role in
the 2009 Panyu protests, making it one of the best publicised anti-incin-
eration protests in China. A local NGO focused on recycling grew out of
the Panyu movement, and it hosted a number of public lectures in 2012.
These dialogues echo what science and technology studies scholars have
identified as the development of “hybrid forums,” where scientists, experts,
activists, and concerned citizens are brought together to form a collec-
tive. (57)
The nature and effect of urban environmental contention in China is still
emerging, and homeowner protesters might open different channels of de-
bate and potentially reinforce current divisions in new forums and modes
of engagement. Within these emerging “hybrid forums,” who can speak and
represent their interests to the state? The urban incineration debate in
Guangzhou illustrates that through the discourse of “rationality,” home-
owners and villagers are representing themselves as separate categories of
environmental protesters. These categories highlight and expand the rural-
urban divide in China against the backdrop of new engagements with sci-
ence, technology, and the state and raise important questions about what
forms of exclusion and collaboration might emerge in China’s developing
urban environmental politics. 
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